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1. introduction 
The theory of effective rate of protection (ERP) has been developed 
in recent years in an attempt to seek a concept G,? protection which, 
in the presence of traded inputs, would be able to perform analytically 
the role that nominal tariffs played in the “older’“, traditional theory 
which was premised on a model which excluded traGed inputs. 
Thus, in the Zraditional model, with two traded goods produced with 
standard restrictions on the production function? by two primary 
factors in given endowment, and the small-country assumption, a tariff 
on a good would lead to: (i) a rise in the (gross) output of the protected 
good; (ii) a rise in the nominal value of its output; (iii) a rise in the 
use of each primary factor therein; (iv) a rise in the real value-added 
therein (which coincides with output, when real value-addeC isdefined 
as deflated by the price of “own output”); and (;lr) a rise in the nominal 
value-added therein (which coincides of course with the nominal value 
r Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation for supporting the research reported 
in this paper. We have had the benefit of correspondence and/or mutual discussions over the 
last year with Chulsoon Khang and, in particular, Michael Bruno, whose paper (1973) in this 
Symposium complements ours admirably. The careful comments of John Chipman have also 
led to many improvements. Above all, we are greatly indebted to Yasuo Uekawa whose 
extremely careful reading has resulted in the removal of errors from earlier drafts. 
2 These should be linear homogene NIS, concave, and factor-intensities hould difFer in equi- 
librium. 
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of oUtpUt).3 For two traded goods and IZ (n > 2) primaiy factors, a 
tariff on one good will continue to imply increase in its output and 
nominal value of output, though not necessarily in each of the primary 
factors used therein. For n (II > 2) traded goods and m (m 3 n) primary 
factors, a tariff on one good will still increase its output and nominal 
value or output, but, when more than one tariff is imposed (implying 
more than one price change), even this cannot be asserted for the good 
with the highest ariff. 
The objective cf ERP theory may then be taken as one of devising a 
concept - of protection which, in the presence of tariff structures in- 
volving the imports of intermediates, constitutes in effect an index 
which will perform the same tasks as nominal tariffs do in the nominal 
tariff theory: i.e. predicting accurately the changes in these variables - 
gross output, nominal value of output, primary factor allocation, real 
value-added and nominal value-added. This, in fact, is the task which 
several analysts in the field of ERP theory have addressed themselves 
to, although a clear distinction has not always been made among these 
alternative ways of defining the objective of ERP theory. Thus, for 
example, Corden (1966) primarily addresses himself to prediction of 
gross outputs; Jones (197 l), in the main text of his paper, also deals 
with gross outputs while an Appendix II is devoted to exploring value- 
added effects; Ramaswami and Srinivasan (197 1) address their Impos- 
sibility theorem to the prediction of gross outputs and primary factor 
movements; Bhagwati and Srinivasan (197 la and 1971 b) analyse the 
efficacy of ERP indices in predicting gross outputs and primary factor 
allocations; Khang (1973) is concerned exclusively with real value- 
added (i.e. nominal value added deflated by own-output-price) changes; 
and Bruno (1973) primarily investigates real value-added (similarly 
d.efined), gross outputs and primary resource shifts.4 
When the problem of ERP theory is so defined, the analysis basically 
amounts to specifying an ERP index which will unambiguously predict 
the tariff-structure-induced changes in the variables pecified. We note 
3 Proposition (i) follows from the concavity of the transformation function; Proposition; W 
follows from the identity of value-added with gross output; and Proposition (iii) follows from 
thettolper-Samuelson theorem. 
We should emphasise that the references listed here are not meant o be exhaustive. The 
reader should not infer from them that this is all that each of the listed authors has written on 
the subject of ERP theory or that other economists have not written on the subject. Moreover, 
we have highlighted only those aspects which are of interest o us from the viewpoint of the 
probliem as defined by us in this paper.. 
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here merely that two basic definitions of such an ERP index have been 
developed in the literature: (i) the Corden-Anderson--Naya definition 
which defines it as the proportionate increment in value-added per unit 
output over the free-trade value-added per unit output,5 and (ii) the 
Cordert-Leith definition which defines it, meaningfully for only sep- 
reduction functions, as the proportionate change in the “price 
of value-added”? It is well known then that the predictive power of 
these ERP indices is substantively limited relative to that of nominal 
tariff theory, especially in regard to predicting gross output changes 
(e.g. Jones, 197 1; Ramaswami-Srinivasan, 197 1; Bhagwati-Srinivasan, 
197 la, to take just a few examples). 
But it is also clear that this approach of making ERP theory attempt 
to do everything that nominal-tariff theory does, in regard to the 
prediction of the variables considered earlier, is to proceed by analytical 
analogy which is more apparent han real. For, clearly it is extremely 
improbable for example that an ERP index should be able to predict 
gross output changes despite the presence of intermediates. Hence, we 
need to pause and ask whether we can ask a somewhat different 
question, founded on an analytically more meaningful analogy, of 
ERP theory so as to compare it more sensibly with nominal-tariff 
theory. We think that this can indeed be done and proceed to do it 
as follows. 
Thus note that, in the traditional analysis of nominal tariffs, the 
tariff leads to a change in the price of output and hence to change in 
output quantity: the change in value-added follows because value-added 
coincides with (gross) output and, in the two-primary-factors case, the 
uni-directional change in e&z primary factor used also follows because 
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The basic proposition, however, 
’ This definition appears to have been suggest4 by analogy to nominal tarifi theory, 
though no explicit statement to that effect has been found by us. Thus, if the domestic value- 
added per unit output is defined as (1 + t) times the foreign-price value-added, t being then 
called the effective tariff, this would make it analogous to the nominal tariff where the 
domestic price is also onapluMhetariff times the foreign price. Cf. Bhagwati and Srinivasan 
(1971a). 
6 Cf. Cotden (1966), Anderson- Waya (1969), and Leith (1968). When intermediate coef- 
ficients will change as a result of substitution, theACorde?-Andetson-Naya definition (using 
symbols introduced later in this paper) becomes: G;:/l$ = Pi - ZajPmj - ZZjPm. / Pi - CaeP,j . 
If then, as recommended by Corden (1966) and accepted by Jones (197 11, Khang (1974 and 
Ray ( 1:73), the changes inaj are ignored, the definition reduces to: 
P/q = PkjPi - C6j P&Ipmi / 1 - ZOj where Oj is the share of j in i. And, where the production 
function is separable, it can be shown that this i?, in fact, nothing but the Corden-Leith 
definition in terms of the proportionate increment in the “price of value added”. 
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consists in relating the change in the quantized of ~t~tyut to the change 
in the price of output, Ithanks to the nominal tariff structure. Indeed, 
this may be taken as lthe primary proposition of the traditional theory 
concerning the effect of a tariff structure on resource allocation. 
The. task of the theory of effective protection may then be conceived 
essentially as one of examining, in a model allowing imported inputs, 
the question whether it is possible to devise a “price” of value-added, 
which can be used as an index to rank different activities uch that, in 
exact analogy with the nominal tariff theory, the change in the “quan- 
tity” of value-added can be correctly predicted. If such an index can 
be devised, then we would be able to treat it as the total analog of the 
nominal tariff in the traditional model. 
But one more dimension of the problem, which does not exist with 
nominal tariff theory, would be: can such an index be measured from 
observed or observable data without having to solve the general equi- 
librium (production) system for the two situations between which the 
resource-allocational shift is being predicted? For, if it cannot be, the 
index would not be of practical value because, to compute it, one 
would have to solve the full system and would thus already know the 
shift in value-added brought about by the tariff structure.’ 
In this paper, we use a general equilibrium, value-theoretic model 
with any number of primary factors, traded intermediates and goods, 
and discuss in terms thereof the question of the existence of a “price” 
of value-added that can serve as the “effective protection” index, 
predicting the shift in the “quantity” of value-added among the dif- 
ferent activities. It is shown that, without loss of generality, one can 
express the proportionate change in nominal value added (consequent 
to a change in tariff structure) in an activity as the sum of two terms, 
the fust of which is a suitably weighted average of the proportionate 
changes in the prices of inputs and outputs involved in that activity 
and the second of which is again a suitably weighted average of the 
proportionate changes in the quantities of primary factor inputs. It is 
further shown that, under two alternative sets of sufficient conditions, 
the first term can indeed be treated as a workable ERP index (with 
the second term serving as the measure of the change in quantity of 
value added that the ERP index is to predict). 
’ In the analysis that follows, we will therefore find that the range of possl%ilities over 
which the ERP index works analytically is larger than the range over which it can be measured 
‘“usefully” in the sense defined in the text. 
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The first set of conditions consists in restricting the clzss of pro- 
duction functions to separable production functions. In this case, a 
physical measure of value added can be defined so that the first term 
(i.e. ERP index) represents the proportionate change in the “price” of 
a physical unit of value added and the second-term represents the 
proportionate change in the quantity (in physical units) of value added. 
The other set of conditions consists in restricting (a) the tariff 
changes to a range and (b) the number of final commodities to two, so 
that the first term, i.e. ERP index (in the absence of separable pro- 
duction functions, no longer representing the proportionate change in 
“price” of value added), nevertheless helps in predicting the sign of the 
second term (which again, in the absence of separable production 
functions, no longer represents the proportionate change in value added 
in physical units). 
2. Sufficiency conditions for ERP theory 
2.1. The model 
Consider an economy producing n tradable goods for final use, using 
d (d 3 n) domestic primary inputs and m imported inputs. Let the 
production function for the ith good be Fi(Di,Mi) where Di = (Di,...D# 
is the column vector of domestic inputs and M’ = (I$,... ,I$ )’ is the 
column vector of imported inputs used in its production. We shall 
assume, for simplicity, that all inputs enter into the production of each 
commodity and that each production function exhibits constant returns 
to scale and is concave. Let each domestic input be supplied inelas- 
tically to the extent of its availability. 
Production is assumed to take place under perfect competition, 
given the domestic price vectors, p = (q,... .e )’ and p = (e,...c )‘, 
respectively of the outputs and imported inputs. For any given p and 
PM, the equilibrium outputs and inputs are assumed to be unique. For 
simplicity, we shall be concerned only with equilibria in which every 
commodity is produced. 
We need some further notations. Let: 
i = 1,2,...rl. 11) 
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(2) i = 1,2,...n .
i = 1,2 ,... n; j, k = 1,2,,...d. (3) 
i = 1,2 ,... n; j = I,2 ,... d; 
k = 1,2,...m. 
(4) 
. 
GiD = (FL&' (5) 
i = 1,2,. A; j, k = 1,2 ,... m. (6) 
v’ = @Fi - (P”)‘Mi = domestic (nominal) value added (7) 
in industry i. 




= POF n n D i = 1,2,...n- 1 I8 (8) 
PF 
. 
i jf=P nf i = 1,2,...n. (9) 
j = 1,2,...d. (10) 
,IZqs. (8) state that the marginal value product of each domestic 
input in each of the first (n- 1) industries equals the marginal value 
’ product of the same input in the nth industry. Eqs. (9) state that the 
mar&al value product of each imported input in anig industry equals 
its price. Eqs. (10) state that the total amount used in all the n in- 
dustries together of each domestic input equals the exogenously spec- 
ified availability . 4 
There are here n(d+m) endogenous variables, namely, qi, A# where 
i = 1,2,...n; j = 1,2 ,... d; and k = I,2 ,... m. There are (n+d+m--- I) exog- 
enous variables, namely, e, Dj, Py where i = 1,2,...rr-- 1; i := 1,2 ,... d; 
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X: = 1,2,...m.’ There are in all n(d+m) equations, consisting of dirt- 1) 
in system (IS), m-2 in system (9) and d in system (10). Thus the number 
of equations equals the number of endogenous variables. We have 
assumed throughout the analysis that the solution is unique and I+/, 
A@ are positive for all i, j, k. 
2.2. TRs analysis 
We can look upon a change in tariff structure as a change in the 
domestic price vectors ?@ and P ? Let p and PM denote a small 
change in p and PM brought about by a small change in tariff struc- 
ture. Let us denote by if’. & A’, the changes in Vi, Di and Mi 
respectively. Differentiating (7) totally we get: 
= @F’- (@")'Mi+If@$)ti>i using (9). 
pi @‘Fi- (i”)‘Mi 










k k ilM1 where Of = _..---- = -.------ = 
POF i 
the competitive share of k-th imported 
i F’ input in ith output. (12) 
8 We could have used the nth commodity as numeraire and set Pi = 1. However, there is no 
reason why a tariff cannot be imposed on this commodity. As such we have not set Pl= 1 by 
definition. Of course if a tariff structure changes all prices in the same proportion, i.e. q/P? = 
v/Ff (i = 1,2,...n; k = 1,2,...nr), the equilibrium outputs and inputs will be unchanged. 





= the competitive share ofjth domestic primary 
input in outpu’t. (13) 
It is seen from (11) that the proportionate change in nominal value 
added in the ith industry, pi/Vi, is the sum of two terms. The first 
term is the weighted average of the proportionate change in the exog- 
enously given prices relevant to the ith industry, the proportionate 
change in price of each input having a negative weight equal to its 
competitive share in output. This term can therefore be interpreted as 
a proportionate change in the “net” price (as it were) of industryi or, 
under conditions to be specified later in this paper, as a proportionate 
change in the “price” (Pi) of value added. 
The second term, on the (Ither hand, is a weighted average of the 
proportionate changes in domestic primary inputs used in industry i, 
each input having a weight equal to its competitive share in output. 
Thus, the second term can be interpreted as a proportionate change in 
“quantity” (as it were) of value added by industry i, or under con- 
ditions to be specified later in this paper, of the quantity Qi in physical 
units of value added. 
Using these symbols, we can thus write purely symbol.ically:g 
9 Note that $/pi in (15) is not (in general) the “proportionate change in value-added per 
unit of output”, which represents the original ERP definition of Corden (1966). lohnson 
(1965) and others. Rather, it is the ERP definition which is recommended by Corden (1969) 
for the case of substitution between imported inputs and domestic factors, and which is used 
by Jones (197 l), Ray ( 1973) aad others. 
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It should be emphasjeed whet our notation &f/Pi and 0:/Q: should 
not be taken to mean tha we are implicitly defining a commodity 
whose output in physical units is Q: and the unit price of which is Pi. 
Indeed, this is in general ina osqible. Of course, if one postulates that 
all tariffs are functions of single policy parameter and changes in 
tariff structure are brou t about by continuous changes in this param- 
eter, one ccx+d interpret (I 5)--( 16) as defining proportionate changes 
in Pi and Qi as this parameter than s. As such, one could integr;ite 
(15) and (16) (assuming the right h d sides of (15) and (16) to be 
integrable as functions of this parameter) starting from arbitrary in&al 
values to obtain Pj and Q$ If we set the initial values so as to satisfy 
V’,,& = Pi(O)Qi(O), the same equality will hold true at all values of the 
policy parameter. But, in general (i.e. except for separable production 
functions), Pi so obtained will not represent in any meaningful sense a 
unit price of a quantity represented by Qf,. 
Whether we are able to define a meaningful PL and Qi or not, how- 
ever, it is nonetheless meaningful to ask whether an index of price 
change as represented by the right hand side of ( 15) is useful in in- 
ferring something about the index of quantity change as represented 
by the right hand side of (16). 
More precisely, suppose that a tariff structure results in @i/Pi > 
(c) P2/P2 = . . . =@/P:. When can we then infer whether the sign of 
0:/Q! i&he same as that of (?i /Pi - @lp,“)? For, if we could, then 
we would have the prcgosition analogous to that in nominal tariff 
theory: i.e. a change in the “price” (as it were) of value-added would 
predict the change in the “quantity” of value-added.‘0 (From (15), 
note further that pi/Pi depends upon s/e, the changes in imported 
“M WI A/ input prices (Pk /Pk ) as IIW~!~ as the elk . From (US?, we see also that 
&IQ: depends on 0: and O;/Di.) 
One possible approach to establishing our sufficiency conditions then 
i$ to look for restrictions on the production function strong enough 
to ensure that tij /Q,’ have thi; same sign regard- 
less of (1) the alternati /e and p’ jJOf that can result 
in a given sign for { ) and p’/Pi = p:Ip,” for i = I .2,...n-- 1 
and (2) the values of 
lo S ?veral ERP-*F-Y; enthusiasts have implied a stronger proposition: t.e. that the ranking 
of two (or more) industries by their ERP index would rank them also by the changes irr their 
resource us?, in one sense or abother: a result that would nat hoId in nominal tariff theory 
either! 
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The second approach is to look for restrictions un e/e and $!/Pr 
such that {& /PI - &!/Pi} and &,&Ii have the same sign regardless 
of O# and O$ iince ‘we are not placing any special restrictions on the 
production functions in the l;&er approach, we have to 100,l~r instead 
for restrictions on the price changes uch that 6//D! has the same 
sign as {Pi/P: - $j/PF} foa’ all j, thus ensuring that & i /Qi is also of 
that sign, 
2.3. Su,fficient restrictions on production functions 
It turns out that the first approach leads to the following restriction 
on the production functions F’: that there exist functions #(Di) which 
depend %~nly on Di such that FZ could be written as: 
F’ s G'[#,M'] m (1’0 
Given linear homogeneity of Fi and its concavity, we can iassume 
without loss of generality that @ is homogeneous of degree one and 
concave (see Arrow, 1972). In other words, each production function is 
“separable” in the sense that the domestic primary inputs used in each 
industry can be aggregated into an index @. 
Now, given (17), we can write: 
. 
F&ii = Gh, (19) 






Suppose now we define T: = P,?Gh . 
Then we can rewrite (8), (9) and (10) as: 
(22) 
*;#$) =: ny”(#) i = 1,2,...n- 1. I (8 1 




= pM i = 1,2,...n. I (9) I f 
kq! = fji 
i=l 
i = 1,2,...d. (10') 
It can be readily seen from (8’) and (10’) that the domestic input 
allocations Df depend only on n’y (i = l,...n) and the total availability 
of each input. Given the linear homogeneity and concavity of ei we 
are back to the traditional model, if we interpret @’ as the net output 
of industry i with $ as its net unit price. 
Hence, if the 7~: rises relative to ni while all other ni’s remain the 
same relative to ‘RF, then the net output of i, i.e. #, will go up. 
(Further, in the special case of a two-industry, two-primary factor 
world, this rise in net output (= value added) will come about by 
industry i attracting each domestic input from the other industry.) 
The gross output price Ph and imported input price vector PM will 
influence domestic factor allocation only through their influence on v$. 
It is now easy to show that T:, as defined by (22), satisfies (15) and 
that #’ satisfies (16), thus linking up our results directly with the 
problem of ERP theory which we had formulated. For, 
Vi = P,OF’-(P,)‘M’ 
= @Ci- (@G$)'M' 
= PI i G'-(Gs)IM'] 
= qG&i since c’ is linear homogeneous 
I 
= +i using (22). 
Hence 
ii = s+Gi 
7 n’; 7’ 
but 6’ = X$+/b; where @/ 
geneous of degree one. 
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i i #JD i i 
fp 
= -L {using (13)). 
ce; 
Hence 2 = 9 
Q) i 
( 4) 2 
Given (Ii), this implies that I$ 9 as defined by (22) satisfies (15). Since 
we have already established that, if $ rises relative to $! while all 
other $s remain the same relative to $, $hen 0’ will go up as well, it 
then follows that the change in the sign of @IQ,! f,s the same as that 
of r&P; - 3:/P:}, so that the problem of ERP theory, as posed by 
us earlier, is indeed solved in this case. 
It is further important to note that, in the case of separable produc- 
tion functions, we can also meaningfully talk of f as price per unit of 
vafue: added and # as quantity (in physical units) of value added in 
each industry. The reason is the following. Slugpose we are given the 
prices w1 ,... We, of the domestie primary inputs. The minimal cost of 
producing one unit of the value added product of industry i is obtained 
by minimizing ci = gwiD/ subject to qhDi) =: 1. ‘The minimal value of 
ci is x(w) where (IT*& are solutions of x@j~ (6’) = w and &8’) = 1. 
Now this minimal unit cost x(w) is exactly equal to the price ny’ of 
value added as defined by (22) if w is set e:qual to the value of eFi 
when D’, 44’ satisfy the equilibrium conditions (9)~( 10). This is easily 
seen by appropriate substitutions and utilising the separability of Fi 
and linear homogeneity qf #‘. 
2.4. Sufficient restrictions on tariff change 
Llet us now turn to the second approach, assuming that F’ are not 
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separable. I1 Let us differentiate the system (8)-( 10) totally. We get: 
fi$ = 0, 
i=l 
(27) 
Eliminating bn and fii (i = 1,2,...n), we get: 
n-l 
(@Ai+&4")iji+l+P~ j$ = s’+t’, (3) 
j=l 
j#i 
where Ai = Fo - FhM(F&,,,,)-l FAD (barring pathologies, FhM 
will have an inverse in the non-separable case) 
Si = (-@FL +@F;) 
ti = - FhM (FhM )-’ (?- @FL) + F;’ (Frc;& (F*- EF; )a 
Let A be the square matrix (in partitioned notation) of order (n-i) 
whose (ii) element is the square matrix Ai] of order d given by: 
bj = pioA’+P’#’ ifi=j 
i = 1,2,...n- 1. (29) 
= PA n n ifi# j I 
I1 This automatically rules out the case of imported inputs being used in fixed proportions 
to output, of course. 
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Then: . A& 3 . ..ig_.>‘ = {(s’ + tl)‘,..., (P-l + Py)’ 
= s+t. (30) 
2.4. I. Change in gross outputs 
Let us evaluate tthe sign of the change in gross output of an industry, 
say the first industry, as well as the change in value added by it. 
= {(F;,)’ - (F$)‘(FA&-l FAD 16’ 
+ (e&)‘(F&,# 
= e(F’$)‘iil + @F’ - (?“)rM1 
(31) 
(32) 
Suppose (as before) that protection is now conferred only on 
(against) industry 1 by the folIowing change in the tariff structure: 
A 
PO p 3 
-!- > (<) - = -k , i = 2 ,... n; k = 1,2 ,... m 
PO 1 PO I ’ Ff 
i.e. the relative prices (in terms of good 1) of goods 2,...11 and all 
imported inputs fall in the same proportion. It can be seen from (15) 
that this structure results in @ /Pj ) > ($!$P$, i = 2.3....n. This would 
rAean that : 
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s’+t’ = 0 i = 2,...n- 1. 
Solving for 6’ from (30) and substituting in (31) we get: 
213 
(34) 
where: IA1 = determinant of A, and O,, 02, O3 are null matrices of order 
1 X 1, 1 X (lt-2)d and (n-2)dX 1 respectively. 
It is clear that the first term in the square bracket in (35) is negative 
since (FMM)-l is a negative definite matrix. The second term is non- 
positive since IAI is of the same sign as (-l)‘n-lld (A is a negative 
definite matrix12 of order (n- 1)d) and 
lr IF1 
V”) - @+,+,I U-(IMM) 
-1 1 
FMD O I 2 
( 1 1 1 -1 1 - F-’ - FDMUfYMMI FM ) 
is of the sign of (- I)@- l)dt 1 . 
Thus 3’ is of sign oplc,? 3site to that of {e/e - p/P!}. Hence, if 
the first industry is conferred positive protection, i.e. {k/q > e/e 1, 
r 2 In general, A is negative semi-definite. To ensure that it is negative definite, we need to 
assume that the vector of equilikium primary factor-ratios in the nth industry is not a scalar 
multiple of the appropriately weighted average of the vectors corresponding to the first (n-l) 
industries, an assumption that reduces in the two-industry, two-factor case to the assumption 
that factor-intensities differ in equilibrium. 
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its gross output F1 goes up and if protection is given against industry 1, 
i.e. @I$ < e/e} then itsg,,poss output goes down. 
2.4.2. Change in (nominal) value added and in Qi . 
This result on gross outputs paradoxically does not extend to (nom- 
inal) value added or to predicting the sign of &/@ (which, of course, is 
our main objective). This is because, unfortunately, (F”)‘$ is not of 
definite sign and hence it is not possible to assert, even with the earlier- 
imposed restrictions on tariff changes, that 0: /Qi is positive (negative) 
according as protection is given to (against) the first industry. In the 
general case of non-separable production functions, therefore, ERP 
theory breaks down (its objective being as defined by us in this paper). 
2.4.3. The two-industry case 
Plowever, in a two-industry economy, with the added assumption 
that the marginal product of any input does not decrease as the quan- 
tity of any other input is increased, we can obtain the results we are 
after. This is seen as follows. 
Given M = 2, A reduces to PfA 1 + @A2. Given our assumption on 
marginal products, the off-diagonal elements of FbD , FhM and all 
elements of F’ DM (== (FhD)‘) are nonlnegative. This, together with the 
concavity of Fi, ensures that (a) (F&&l consists cf nonpositive l- 
ements and (b) the off-diagonal elements of Ai are non-negative. Since 
A = CA1 + $A2 is thus a negative definite matrix with non-negative 
off-diagonal elemenis, A- 1 zonsists of nonpositive lem:ents. Now B, = 
A-%‘+ tl) =e@/P$--$/e)AW1 {FA - F1 when 
the tariff change is restricted to (e/q = Pk /Pk % DI 
(F&M)-lFh) 
) , k = 1,2,...m. Since 
(F&-P (F$,#F&J > 0, it follows that b, is of sign opposite to 
that of 8$/$ -e/4)}. 
&nce, if the tariff structure results in protection beirlg conferred on 
industry 1 (i.e. 3/e > @/I$! = !f/PkM, k = 1,2,...m),, this industry 
attracts all domestic resources and its gross output, nominal value 
added and Qi go up. If e/e = &/Pf > @f/e, then it is industry 2 
which gets protection and it will attract each domes& resource rem 
suiting in its gross output, nominal value added and Q: going up. ERP 
theory will work, in the sense defined by us; and we also have “nice”’ 
results on gross output and nominal value added changes consequent 
on change in the tariff structure. 
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2.5. The RamaSWami-StiFliJ?aSaFi and Jortes- Kkang analyses 
Our analysis of the two-industry model has immediate implica- 
tions for the existing analyses in the literature, especially those by 
Ramaswami-Srinivasan (197 I) and by Jones (I 97 1) and Khang (1973). 
In particular, the apparent divergence in the results obtained by 
Ramaswami-Srinivasan and by Jones, on the possibility of “perverse” 
changes in gross outputs, can now be easily explained by us and the 
results therefore reconciled.*3 
All these authors discuss effective protection in the context of a 
two-industry model with two domestic inputs and one imported input. 
However, while the R-S model allows the use of the imported input 
by both industries, the J-K model restricts its use only to the first 
industry. The change in tariff structure considered by R-S involves 
subsidisation of the imported input, leaving the output prices un- 
changed (thus placing it outside the range discussed earlier) while J-K 
change one output price (that of industry 1) and the price of its 
imported input, thus allowing for changes in tariff structure in as welt 
as out of the range. 
To relate their results with ours, let us tabulate A, i@ Fr, and 
(sl + tl) for the R-S, J-K models and evaluate b1 = A’$’ + t1 1. 
(See table 1.) Note further that, while the production functions as- 
sumed by R-S have the property that the marginal product of any 
input does not fall if the quantity used of some other input is increased, 
such a property is not postulated by the J-K model. In order to 
pinpoint the importance of resource endowment in the R-S counter 
example, let us therefore modify the J-K model by postulating the 
above assumption on marginal products. 
With this assumption, in both models the off-diagonal elements of 
A are non-negative and hence the elements of A-’ and (F’hM)-1 (in 
l3 Khang (i973) uses the Jones model but deals with the predictability of (clearly-defined) 
real value added changes consequent on changes in the tariff structure whereas Jones’ focus 
is on 6ross output changes. Jones’ Appendix I1 considers changes in value added but it is not 
clear to us whether he intends to consider nominal or real value added shifts and, if the latter, 
what his definition is. His Appendix I, which attempts at reconciling the R-S analysis with 
Jones’ own results on gross output changes, is on the other hand clear but (as is evident from 
our analysis in the tex? above) unfortunately not really to the point in ignoring wholly the 
Feally critical difference which exists between the two models in respect of the assumption 
with regard to the use of the intermediate input by the two industries and which makes the 
primary-factor resource endowment of the economy critical to the R-S conclusions and 
irrelevant o the J-K analyses. 
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Table 1 
Critical values in tlw X:--S and J-K models 
Model A 
the J-K model, only F&M is defined) are nonpositive. Since 8,) the 
change of domestic factors used in industry 1, is by definition 8-l 
(sl + tl), it follows that,, if the elements of s1 + t’ are of the same sign, 
then the elements of & are of the same sign. If, however, the elements 
of (sr + tl) are of opposite signs, then the sign IJf the elements of 8, 
cannot be determined without knowledge of the magnitudes of the 
elements of A-’ and of s1 + fl. 
For the tariff change considered by R-S, the signs of the elements 
of s1 + t1 are a priori indeterminate while their magnitudes depend on 
the prices (e, P$, $) as well as the factor allocations since the 8”&, 
FdM depend on these. Hence the same change in the pattern of prices, 
<and hence the same pattern of protection), could (and in their numer- 
ical zxample, does) result in positive or negative signs for the elements 
of Dr depending on the aggregate factor endowment (which helps 
determine the factor allocations). 
By contrast, in the J-K model, (modified, as noted earlier, for the 
restriction on the sign of marginal products), the elements of s1 + t’ 
are necessarily of o;‘re sign, thus determining unambiguously the sign of 
6, Tegardless of the factor endowments, as long as the tariff changes 
are confined to those noted immediately below. Thus: 
d, 5 (5) 0 if either: (a) 4 = 0 and fir :g (2) 0; or 
(b) Fy/Py = &f@ and fi 2 (g) 0; or 
(c) ?r/P*W , <: (>) @f/P! and e 2 (s)O. 
In all these three cases of tariff change, the industry gaining protection 
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(i.e. increasing its pi/Pi relative to that in the other industry) will gain 
domestic resources, increase its nominal value added (and hclT.re its 
g/Q; > 0 - the last validating ERP theory in the sense defined by us). 
However, outside of the range of tariff changes described in (a)-(c), 
one could observe domestic factor movements and changes ig nominal 
value added as also in Qi in a direction opposite to that indicated by 
the pattern of protection.*4 
The breakdown of ERP theory in the (modified) J-K model is thus 
easily seen to arise in a substantively different manner from its break- 
down in the R-S model. This is yet clearer when we note that the tariff 
change (@ = 0, py< 0) can yield opposite results for the sign of aI , de- 
pending on the aggregate factor efidowment in the R-S model, while 
in the modified J-K model it Leads unambiguously to s1 > 0: this 
asymmetry in the two models is attributable entirely to the fdct of the 
imported input entering only the first industry in the J-K model but 
both industries in the R-S model. 
3. “Useful” measurability of ERP index 
To sum up, one can define a measure of effective protection which 
performs, in the non-traditional model with imported inputs, a role 
completely analogous to that of nominal tariffs in the traditional model 
without imported inputs, only in the case of separable production 
functions. ISI the case of non-separrble production functions, the anal- 
ogy between effective protection and nominal protection breaks down 
except in cases where effective protection is conferred on an industry 
through particular forms of tariff change, and the number of final 
commodities i  only two. 
We now address ourselves to the question whether, even in the cases 
where sufficiency conditions obtain, for the ERP index to predict 
quantity-index shifts correctly, the ERP index can be measured “use- 
” Note that, iq the cases where therd are only two primary factors, the “workabilit! ” of 
the ERP index <p:), in both the cases of sufficiency conditions distinguished in this paper, is 
.” qsociated with the increment in value-added following ERP-protection being accompanied by 
the increase in employment in this industry of both the primary factors. The Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem’s validity in each instance is thus critical to this outcome, as noted by 
‘Jhagwati-Srinivasan (1971a). Note also that the R-S counter-example is characterised by the 
primary-factor-ratios in the two activities going in contrary directions, thus invalidating the 
Stolper-Samuelson argument: also read Khang (1973) from this point of view. 
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fully”, i.e. without having access to the kind of information which 
would enable us to solve directly for the resource allocational effects 
of the tariff structure. It turns out that this range of possibilities is 
even narrower. 
Remember that our analysis has been in terms of “differentials.” To 
be of any policy use at all, one should be able to assess the impact of 
non-infinitesimal changes in the tariff structure. Indeed, in the tradi- 
tional model, we have the comparative tstatic result that any increasein 
the t;ariff on imports of one commodity, ceteris yaribus, will result in 
an increased production of that commodity in the new equilibrium. 
Formally of course, in the non-traditional model also, given that pro- 
ductialn functions are separable, we can say that any change in tariff 
structure which results in an increase irt “price” of value added in one 
industry, ceteris paribus, will result in an inc’rease in the “quantity” of 
value added Gf that industry in the new ~equilibrium. 
However, one cannot in general compute ,the pattern of “price’:” of 
value added from the knowledge of the &riff structure done - one 
needs information on the production functions. This is in contrast to 
the traditional model where one can predict that, ceteris paribus, the 
equilibrium output of a commodity will got up consequent on an in- 
crease in the tariff on this commodity without drawing upon any 
knowledge of its production function. 
This fact is evident from our definit.ion of ERP in ( 15). In order to 
obtain the. “price” of value added after a non4nfinitesimal change in 
tariff structure!, essentially we have to :integrate (15). in the absence of 
imported inputs, (15) reduces to e/J? and hence the integral is the 
proportionate change in output price alone and can be computed 
directly from the tariff change. However, once imported inputs are 
admitted, Oiy or the share of each implortecl input in output enters the 
expression and in general Bik * depends on the prices, a functiona! 
(dependence that ca.n be derived from the production function. Without 
a knowledge of this dependence, one cannot, in general, carry out the 
required integration. For instance, if this dependence takes the simple 
form that O# arr: constant - a situation that arises in the case where 
the production function is Cobb-Douglas in the ivpqrted inputs and. 
the index of domestic factors, such that Fi == [#@)] % (M~)@!L..cM,)% . 
with Zj$r $ = 1 :znd @‘(D’) is homogeneous of degree one in domestic 
inputs and concave - we can perform the integration with the infor- 
mation Of1 0it obtained from the initial equilibrium and with the 
knowledge of the proposed changes in tariff structure. Another instance 
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is the case where each imported input is used in fixed proportions with 
output in each production function: in this case, also, the relevant 
information is contained in the initial equilibrium input/output ratios 
and the proposed changes in tariff structure. 
In other cases, such as the general CES production function (which 
is, of course, separable) one can try to get by with “approximations” 
by assuming that the change in tariff structure is sufficiently small that 
either imported input coefficients or their shares in output remain 
approximately equal to their initial equilibrium values: but one really 
cannot get “correct” ERP indices measured usefully for the kinds of 
“re_al-life”, “large” tariff structures which ERP-enthusiasts have been 
discussing in most recent contributions. 
4. Conchsions 
Our analysis thus leads us to conclude, somewhat nihilistically, that: 
(i) A measure of ERP which will work unfar~Z~~gZ3~ in analogy with 
nominal tariff theory does not always exist; 
(ii) The range of sufficient conditions over which an ERP index will 
SO work is significantly narrower than that over which the nominal 
tariff theory will so work in the traditional trade-theoretic model with- 
out imported inputs; and 
(iii) The range of sufficient conditions over which such a working 
ERP index can be measured “usefully” - i.e. without solving the 
general equilibrium production system for both the situations over 
which the resource shift is sought to be prefiicted - is yet narrower. ’ 
These nihilistic conclusions are reinforced by four further obser- 
vations: 
(i) As we would expect, even when an ERP index works analogously 
to nominal tariffs, it does not necessarily work in predicting output 
shifts: and the latter are of greater interest in trade negotiations ~:yrhere 
ERP’s may be thought of as replac’mg nominal tariffs in the future. 
(ii) Recent studies, by Cohen (1969) and Guisinger and Schydlowsky 
(1970), of the relationship between the (calculated) nominal tariffs and 
SRP’s in a number of empirical studies have shown that a remarkably 
high correlation exists between them: thus raising the question whether 
it is useful to spend vast resources on calculating ERP’s when nominal 
;ariffs seem to be adequate proxies for them anyway. 
(iii) In a multi-comm~,dity world where tariffs are levied on more 
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than one commodity or input, we could not even tell, when the dif- 
ferent processes were ranked by their ERP’s in a chain, that the highest- 
ERP process would have gained resources and the lowest-ERP process 
would have lost theai, in relation to the pre-trade situ;jtion. As with 
nominal tariffs, the scope of purely “qualitative economics” is negli- 
gible in this real-world case, so that once again the vast empirical effort 
required in making up the ERP numbers eems grossly disproportionate 
to what can be done to predict actual resource-allocational impacts of 
the tariff structure without resort to the full general-equilibrium so- 
lution. 
(iv) It r,,ay finally be noted that attempts at arguing that the con- 
stancy of the (imported-factor) ai’s is a reasonable restriction because 
raw materials do not substitute with domestic factors and are in a 
fairly fixed proportion to output are based on a false equation of the 
imported factors with intermediates and raw materials. Most economies 
import capital goods and these do substitute with (domestic) labour 
quite generally. And, indeed, it is not at all uncommon for there to be 
substitution between intermediates and primary factors, though admit- 
tedly this is less important in practice than the substitution among the 
primary factors, capital and labour. 
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